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Political Budget Cycles and Reelection Prospects 
 in Greece’s Municipalities 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper considers the presence of political budget cycles in Greece’s municipalities. 
We construct a new dataset from primary sources and we find strong evidence of pre-
electoral manipulation through increased expenditures and excessive borrowing. We use a 
dynamic panel data approach producing evidence of opportunistic behavior in local 
government finances. Our results are robust in the face of a series of controls including 
mayors running for reelection, their political alignment with the central government, and 
prolonged terms. Moreover, the results are robust to the exclusion of small sized 
municipalities and to the restriction of the time range of our investigation to the post-
Maastricht period. We also consider whether opportunistic policies influence incumbents’ 
reelection prospects finding that increased expenditures and election year opportunistic 
excesses are electorally rewarding. Our findings provide a characterization of opportunistic 
public finances management in Greek municipalities where electorally motivated budgetary 
decisions appear impervious to the various municipal reform attempts. 
Keywords: Political Budget Cycles, Reelection, Municipalities, Greece, Panel Data 
JEL Classification: D72, H7, C23 
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1. Introduction 
Greece’s economic and political environment is characterized, inter alia, by weak 
institutions, extensive opportunistic behavior by incumbents, substantial rent-seeking 
(Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos, 2009), clientelism, and cronyism (Phelps, 2015). Such 
concerns may also afflict local government politics, which in Greece are closely 
associated with national politics. This paper focuses on Greek municipal budgets and 
pre-electoral manipulation of public finances as one manifestation of such 
phenomena. It considers the presence of politically induced opportunistic cycles in 
municipal fiscal policies. In addition, it examines how these electorally motivated 
budgetary policies affect mayors’ reelection prospects. We construct a new dataset 
from primary sources, which covers 109 municipalities from 1985 to 2004 and 
corresponds to half of Greece's population. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt 
to identify Political Budget Cycles (PBCs) in Greece’s municipalities and to consider 
the expenditures' impact on mayors’ reelection prospects. 
Our focus on Greek municipalities provides some unique insights in Greece’s 
political economy. First, our newly collected data allow us to investigate the presence 
of PBCs at the municipal level in the context of an advanced economy with a long 
history of political instability, weak institutions and high levels of political 
polarization. Second, studying Greece allows us to test if changes in the institutional 
framework, in this case the constraints implied by the country’s effort to join the 
Economic and Monetary Union, had any effect on the opportunistic policies at the 
municipal level. Third, our data allow us to study the impact of elections on 
borrowing by the municipalities, a budget element absent from many other relevant 
studies. Although the magnitude of municipal borrowing is very limited in the case of 
Greece, it is nevertheless indicative of incumbents’ opportunistic behavior. Fourth, 
given that local and national politics in Greece are closely related, we are able to 
systematically investigate how the interactions (alignment) between the different 
layers of government affect the size of the opportunistic cycle. Fifth, since no term 
limits apply for Greek mayors, we study the previously unexplored effects that a 
prolonged incumbency may have on the magnitude of municipal PBCs. Finally, as a 
key element of all reforms pertaining to local government in Greece over the last two 
decades has been the reduction in their number on the grounds of efficiency, we 
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4 
explicitly test whether small municipalities are more conducive to the presence of 
PBCs or not.  
 Our evidence suggests that mayors in Greece manipulate fiscal policy prior to 
elections as the budget balance deteriorates during election years, while total 
expenditures, its highly visible investment component and municipal borrowing all 
increase. The electoral effects on investment expenditures appear more pronounced 
when the mayor is aligned to the central government ruling party or when he is 
running for another term, while no evidence exists that the magnitude of the PBC is 
affected by prolonged incumbency. Our analysis also shows that PBCs are present in 
the post-Maastricht era and that their existence is robust to the exclusion of small-
sized municipalities from our sample.  
We also examine how the electorally motivated budgetary policies affect mayors’ 
reelection prospects. Our evidence shows that both increased expenditures over the 
full term and election year opportunistic deviations have a positive effect on mayors’ 
reelection prospects. This finding can explain both the emergence of political budget 
cycles and the persistent mismanagement of local public finances. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the 
relevant literature for PBCs at the local government level and the effects of 
opportunistic policies on incumbents’ reelection possibilities. Section 3 provides 
some highlights on Greece’s local government institutions and political framework. 
Section 4 discusses our newly constructed dataset and estimation strategy for the 
detection of PBCs, while Section 5 presents and discusses the results of our analysis. 
Section 6 considers whether municipal expenditures affect mayors’ reelection 
prospects. Finally, Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Survey 
2.1  Political Budget Cycles at the Local Government Level 
Political Budget Cycles emerge due to opportunistically motivated incumbents 
who try to enhance voters’ economic well-being before elections (Franzese and 
Jusko, 2006) as evidence suggests that economic conditions influence government 
support. This link, known as “economic voting”, has been studied with the help of 
voting and popularity functions (VP-functions) that explain government support 
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5 
(either in elections or polls) as a function of political and economic outcomes 
(Nannestad and Paldam, 1994).1 
While recent research identifies several PBC determinants at the national level2, 
there is a growing literature considering political cycles at the local level where 
greater homogeneity in government structure, available policy instruments (Veiga 
and Veiga, 2007a) and uniformity in electoral rules and dates (Sakurai and Menezes-
Filho, 2011) are present. For instance, Blais and Nadeau (1992) show that in Canada 
provincial governments’ spending on social services and infrastructure construction 
increases during election years. Similarly, Galli and Rossi (2002) document the 
presence of election year increases in total expenditures and various spending 
categories like health care, education and road construction in Germany’s federal 
states. In the setting of a young, recently established democracy, Akhmedov and 
Zhuravskaya (2004) report evidence of PBCs in Russia’s regional elections, 
identifying electoral effects on public spending, financed by deficit and federal 
transfer increases. Along the same lines, Sjahrir et al. (2013) uncover evidence of 
opportunistic cycles in Indonesia’s districts with electoral effects being present in 
direct elections and of a larger magnitude when the incumbent runs for reelection. 
Evidence on the presence of politically induced cycles at subnational level finances 
are not solely confined to the post WWII period. Aidt and Mooney (2014) focus on 
London Boroughs for the early part of the 20th century documenting the presence of 
political budget cycles that are conditional on the suffrage regime, either taxpayer or 
universal suffrage. Under the former election year tax cuts are observed while under 
the latter capital spending increases during election years.   
A number of other papers study explicitly the emergence of PBCs at the level of 
municipal administrative entities. Veiga and Veiga (2007a) produce evidence of 
electoral effects in Portuguese municipalities. Their results show that elections have a 
                                                          
1
 Kramer (1971), Fair (1978), Madsen (1980) and Lewis-Beck (1988) are among the first who provide 
evidence in support of the economic voting hypothesis. Nannestad and Paldam (1994) review early 
evidence and conclude that VP-functions can explain government support when voters hold the 
government responsible for the economic conditions. Evidence from recent studies are also consistent 
with the economic voting hypothesis. See for example Swank and Eisinga (1999), Feld and 
Kirchgässner (2000), Chappell and Veiga (2000) and Tucker (2001). For a review of recent evidence 
see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2013). 
2
 For instance, Shi and Svensson (2006) focus on the level of economic development, Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) on constitutional features, Brender and Drazen (2005) on the age of democracy, Alt 
and Lassen (2006) on the transparency of fiscal institutions, Streb et al., (2009) on the effectiveness of 
checks and balances, while Rose (2006) on  fiscal rules. For a review of the literature see Drazen 
(2000), Franzese and Jusko (2006), and  De Haan and Klomp (2013).  
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6 
negative effect on the budget balance through the decrease of local tax collection and 
the increase of municipal expenditures. Moreover, they show that before elections 
opportunistically motivated incumbents change the composition of expenditures 
towards highly visible by the electorate investment items, such as construction of 
overpasses and street works. Likewise, Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011) test for 
opportunistic and partisan cycles in Brazilian municipalities. In particular, their 
results show that elections have a positive impact on total and current expenditures 
and a negative impact on local tax revenues. They document a negative overall 
electoral effect on the local budget balance and, contrary to other studies, a similar 
effect on municipal investment. Foucault et al. (2008) report analogous electoral 
effects in France as all categories of public spending increase prior to elections. More 
recently, Drazen and Eslava (2010) consider Colombian municipalities, constructing 
a model of PBCs where incumbents manipulate the composition of expenditures to 
target specific segments of the electorate. They produce evidence showing that the 
most visible components of expenditures (e.g., road construction, power and water 
plants) expand before elections, while non-visible components (e.g., interest 
payments) contract. With regard to the institutional conditions under which PBCs 
occur at the municipal level, Benito et al. (2013) focus on Spanish municipalities and 
study how the introduction of a balanced budget rule affects PBCs. They argue that in 
the presence of such a rule, electoral cycles still emerge but only after local 
governments have created the necessary fiscal room.  
 
2.2 Political Budget Cycles and Reelection Prospects 
If opportunistic/electoral concerns can affect budgetary policies at the local 
government level, a natural question arises as to how rewarding opportunism is. A 
closely related to the PBC, but usually separate, strand of the literature focuses on 
whether higher pre-electoral expenditures are beneficial for the incumbent or not. The 
evidence is somewhat mixed as results both in favor and against this hypothesis have 
been reported. Peltzman (1992), for instance, argues that US voters are averse to 
higher spending as they actually penalize officials for increased spending before 
elections. Brender and Drazen (2008) study a large sample of countries and conclude 
that excess deficits do not boost incumbents’ reelection probabilities either in 
developed or developing countries and show that increased deficits during election 
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years reduce the prospects for reelection in developed countries with established 
democratic institutions. At the local level, Brender's (2003) findings from studying 
Israeli’s local governments reaffirm the voters’ fiscal conservatism hypothesis, while 
the findings of Drazen and Eslava (2010) from Colombian municipalities similarly  
show that high deficits affect negatively the share of votes received by the incumbent 
parties. Nevertheless, increases in the share of capital expenditures, perceived by the 
authors as targeted spending, positively affect the share of votes received.  
Other studies, however, that focus on local governments find that pre-electoral 
budget manipulation can be rewarding. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) 
document that increases in the size of fiscal cycles positively affects an incumbent’s 
probability of reelection in Russia’s regional elections. Likewise Veiga and Veiga 
(2007b), show that in Portuguese municipalities election year increases in investment 
expenditures are associated with higher vote percentages for the incumbents. For the 
case of Brazilian municipalities, Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) also show that 
increased public expenditures significantly influence mayors’ reelection prospects as 
increases in spending, both in election years and throughout the term, enhance 
mayors’ probability of remaining in office. More recently, Aidt et al. (2011) pursue 
an innovative approach to examine the joint determination of incumbents' win margin 
and the opportunistic distortion in Portuguese municipalities' finances prior to 
elections. They document that pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is larger when an 
incumbent is facing a tight race and provide evidence that increased expenditures 
during election years positively affect an incumbents’ win margin. Finally, Balaguer-
Coll et al. (2015) focus on municipal elections in Spain and document, with the use of 
Bayesian techniques, that increases in public spending positively affect incumbents' 
probability of re-election. 
 
3. Greece’s Municipal Institutions and Political Framework 
Municipal elections in Greece were held every four years, during October, under 
universal adult suffrage with the timing of elections being exogenously fixed and a 
uniform two round voting system applying to all municipalities. Registered voters 
decide over different electoral lists that candidate mayors put together and lead. The 
political parties strongly influence, if not directly determine, the selection of mayor 
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8 
candidates and their lists. They publically announce their support for a candidate and 
their lists and back them with financial contributions and mobilization of party 
members. The winning list elects both the mayor and the majority of the members in 
the municipal council. Mayors lead the administration, manage human resources, and 
oversee municipal operations, exerting strong influence both over the administration 
and the municipal council. Local politics in Greece to a large extent mirrors national 
politics, which up until the 2012 elections, have been dominated by two main parties, 
the right-wing “New Democracy” and the left-wing “PASOK”. The candidate mayors 
of those parties also prevailed in Greece’s local elections and were in effect provided 
by the electorate with “unchecked and unsupervised mandates” (Pelagidis and 
Mitsopoulos, 2012).   
Several attempts to improve the administrative capacity and financial transparency 
at the local level have been made in the past. The 1997 and 2010 reform acts were 
among the most significant. Their key feature was to introduce extensive mergers 
among municipalities, reducing their number in order to improve efficiency. Reform 
Act 2539/1997 reduced the number of local level administrative entities from 
thousands to 910 municipalities and 124 smaller communes, while the latest 2010 
reform act completely eliminated the smaller communes and further reduced the 
number of municipalities to 325. 
Municipalities in Greece operate under uniform fiscal rules and are mainly 
financed through the central government’s budget. Municipalities have the ability to 
impose compensatory taxation but revenues from this source are small when 
compared to those received via the central government’s budget. Similarly, 
borrowing is, typically, from government controlled financial institutions and 
constitutes only a small portion of total revenues. Nevertheless, municipalities in 
Greece draw up their budget every fiscal year on their own and decide freely on the 
allocation of their resources. Municipalities must meet a number of payments such as 
administrative expenditures and meet their debt repayment schedule. Moreover, 
various categories of expenditures that exceed a certain amount are subject to 
approval by the Court of Audit before the municipalities can disburse the related 
funds.
3
 Besides the judiciary, the central administration supervises municipal finances 
                                                          
3 In particular, after the 2010 administrative reform expenditures exceeding €100,000 are subject to 
obligatory legal inspection by the Court of Audit. If the expenditure fails to meet legal requirements it 
cannot be made. 
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9 
and data are reported to the Hellenic Statistical Authority. Municipal accounts in 
Greece are released a considerable time after the end of each financial period and 
generally go unnoticed by the public.4 
 
  
4. Data and Estimation Strategy 
4.1 Data on Municipal Finances 
We construct and use a new dataset on Greek municipal finances. Our panel 
consists of 109 municipalities, representing about half of Greece’s population (2001 
Census). To ensure institutional homogeneity and continuity in our dataset, we focus 
only on those municipalities that have not been affected by the extensive municipal 
mergers introduced by the 1997 administrative reform. The time dimension of our 
panel ranges from 1985 to 2004 and encompasses five municipal elections, held in 
1986, 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2002. Our data start in 1985 when data are available for 
all municipalities. The time series length is constrained by changes in the financial 
reporting standards for Greek municipalities, which render the data after 2005 
incompatible with earlier reporting. We obtain the annual data on Greece’s municipal 
finances from various publications of the Hellenic Statistical Authority (HSA).5  
Data on political variables are collected by the authors. In particular, we construct 
a dataset on mayors’ political affiliation relying on primary sources by considering 
the publicly announced party nominations prior to municipal elections as well as their 
systematic reporting in public media afterwards. The data on candidacies and 
mayors’ terms are retrieved from the national archive of electoral results at the Greek 
Ministry of Interior. The remaining variables used were obtained from the Hellenic 
Statistical Authority. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A1 in Appendix A. 
 
4.2 Empirical Model Specification and Estimation Method 
We use a typical model of PBCs (e.g., Shi and Svensson, 2006; Veiga and Veiga, 
2007a; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2011) specified as: 
                                                          
4 
This is not untypical. See Veiga and Veiga (2007a) for the case of Portugal. 
5 We obtained some data in excel format (1999-2004) after request, while the 1985-1998 series were 
constructed by going through the “Municipalities and Communes Income–Expenditure” publications 
for each single year. These reports are publicly available but, at the time of writing this paper, only in 
Greek. 
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(1) 
where the dependent variable  denotes one of the j fiscal variables in municipality 
i at time t and is the lag of the dependent variable used to capture persistence 
in the fiscal variables, is a vector of k control variables, and Electionsit is a 
dummy variable capturing the electoral effect. It takes the value of one in election 
years and zero otherwise. The terms and represent the unobserved 
municipality specific effects and an i.i.d. error term, respectively.6 The fiscal policy 
variables include the Budget Balance, Borrowing Revenues, Total Expenditures, and, 
the highly visible to the electorate, Investment Expenditures. All variables are 
expressed in logarithms of Euros per capita (2005 prices), with the exception of the 
Budget Balance that can take negative values (e.g., Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 
2011). The vector includes a number of economic, demographic and political 
explanatory variables. The economic variables include revenues from central 
government in the form of direct transfers (GovSubsidies) and the amount of 
revenues collected from municipalities through special government-levied taxes 
(GovLeviedTaxes). To account for the effect of municipal population size, we 
construct a variable (Population Category), following Veiga and Veiga (2007a), 
which assigns the value of 1 to the two largest cities, and 2, 3, and 4 to cities with a 
population over 40,000, 10,000-40,000, and less than 10,000, respectively. To control 
for the population’s age structure, following Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011), we 
include two demographic variables that represent the percentage of the population 
under 15 years old and over 65 years old (%Pop<15, %Pop>65). As mayors’ 
political ideology may influence fiscal decisions, we include an Ideology variable to 
account for possible partisan effects. We classify Greek mayors as left-wing or right-
wing according to the party that publicly supports them and we attribute a certain 
partisan affiliation only when a mayor is elected under a party’s explicitly expressed 
support. The Ideology variable takes the value of -1 if the mayor of municipality i is 
supported by a left-wing party, the value of 0 if the mayor is not supported by any 
party, and the value of 1 if the mayor of municipality i is supported by a right-wing 
                                                          
6 
Since elections are synchronized across all municipalities in Greece we do not include time fixed 
effects because election year effects cannot be separated from aggregate shocks. Our approach on this 
issue is similar to Aidt and Mooney (2014). 
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party. To capture the effect of prolonged incumbencies, we use the number of years 
that a mayor has been in office since 1982 (Years as Mayor).7  
Equation (1) is a standard dynamic panel data specification. Nevertheless, the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable and municipality specific effects renders the 
OLS estimator biased and inconsistent. Although the Fixed-Effects (FE) estimator 
eliminates the unit specific effects, it cannot eliminate the bias introduced by the 
inclusion of lagged dependent variables among the regressors. The order of the FE 
estimator bias is 1/T, where T corresponds to the time length of the panel. For small, 
even moderate T, the FE estimator is inconsistent but becomes consistent as T gets 
larger (Kiviet, 1995; Nickell, 1981). Given that the time length of our panel is 20 
years, the use of the Fixed Effects estimator in the context of a dynamic model may 
give rise to a non-negligible bias. To address this possibility, we employ the Blundell 
and Bond (1998) two-step system GMM estimator for dynamic panel data (see also, 
Shi and Svensson, 2006; Veiga and Veiga, 2007a; Efthyvoulou, 2012). This estimator 
augments the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator using lagged 
differences of the dependent variables as instruments in the levels equations in 
addition to lagged levels of the dependent variables, which are used as instruments 
for the equations in first differences (see Arellano and Bover, 1995; Baltagi, 2008). 
Since the estimated standard errors of the two step GMM estimator tend to be 
severely downward biased, we correct the bias using the Windmeijer (2005) finite 
sample correction (see Windmeijer, 2005; Roodman, 2009a). To avoid misleading 
results caused by instrument proliferation, we collapse the instrument set, as 
suggested by Roodman (2009b), to reduce the number of moment conditions. Finally, 
we perform the Arellano-Bond (1991) tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation of the differenced residuals and the Hansen test for over-identifying 
restrictions. 
 
5. Results and Discussion  
5.1 Baseline Evidence 
Table 1 presents our baseline results.8 The evidence shows that Elections has a 
negative and significant effect on the Budget Balance at the 5% significance level, 
                                                          
7
 Incumbents in 1985 (the first year in our dataset) were elected in the 1982 municipal elections.  
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12 
while it positively affects Total Expenditures and its, highly visible to the electorate, 
subcategory of Investment Expenditures (both at the 10% level of significance). The 
latter includes infrastructure expenditures such as construction of roads, bridges and 
overpasses. This finding corroborates similar results documented in other relevant 
studies (see e.g., Veiga and Veiga, 2007a; Drazen and Eslava, 2010). 
The existing literature on municipal finances and elections, typically, does not 
address how elections may affect local government borrowing9 whose pattern, as in 
the case of Greece, may be indicative of incumbents’ opportunistic behavior. The 
results reported in Table 1 reveal that the effect of elections on Borrowing is positive 
and statistically significant at the 5% level. The evidence suggests that in election 
years the budget balance decreases by 0.012 euros (in per capita terms, 2005 euros), 
while total expenditures rise by 3.1%, investment expenditures increase by 8.15% 
and borrowing increases by 120%. Our findings corroborating similar electoral 
effects identified in studies on PBCs at the local level. The results also suggest that 
increased government transfers positively affect Investment Expenditures, while the 
population structure variables have a positive effect on Total Expenditures and its 
sub-component of Investment Expenditures in municipalities with a high percentage 
of young (under 15) people. This reflects the fact that extended parts of schooling 
provisions are a municipal responsibility, while expenditures pertaining to elderly 
population, such as social security schemes and healthcare, are primarily provided by 
the central government. In addition, the results in Table 1 indicate that the small size 
of municipalities has a positive effect on the Budget Balance and Investment 
Expenditures, while it negatively affects Borrowing. Results also show that partisan 
effects are absent in the case of Greek municipalities.
10
 
The following section considers whether the magnitude of the opportunistic cycle 
depends on various factors that either enhance incumbents’ incentives for 
electioneering or impede their ability to pursue such policies. We focus on whether 
                                                                                                                                                                     
8 For robustness purposes we have also considered a Fixed Effects estimator and the results are broadly 
consistent with those produced by the two-step system GMM estimator. 
9
 A part of the literature considers how constitutional restrictions may affect local public debt. For 
example, Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) consider a cross section of 134 Swiss municipalities, while 
Cabasés et al. (2007) focus on Spanish municipalities. Letelier (2011) examines political determinants 
of municipal borrowing in Chile for the period 2004-2007. Geys (2007) considers opportunistic local 
debt cycles in Flemish municipalities with a focus on the implications of fractionalized government.   
10
 This result is similar to that of Veiga and Veiga (2007a) who provide evidence from Portuguese 
municipalities showing that partisan effects are solely confined to capital expenditures, which are 
higher under right-wing mayors.. 
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political cycles vary with mayors’ political alignment with the central government, 
their running for another term or not, and the number of years in office (prolonged 
incumbency). 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
5.2  Running for Another Term, Political Alignment and Prolonged Incumbency 
A mayor’s decision to run for another term or not may affect the presence and/or 
magnitude of political cycles. Rosenberg (1992) argues that incumbents who do not 
seek reelection generate larger political cycles as they try to secure gains for the post-
election period. On the other hand, Veiga and Veiga (2007a) show that the presence 
of political cycles and their magnitude in Portuguese municipalities are not affected 
by whether a mayor opts for reelection or not. 
To test if a mayor’s decision to run for another term affects the magnitude of the 
electoral effect we allow Elections to interact with a dummy variable (ReCandidate), 
which takes the value of one when the mayors run for reelection and zero otherwise. 
Evidence presented in Table 2, Columns (1) - (4) show that the coefficient of the 
interaction term Elections*ReCandidate, is not statistically significant except in the 
case of Total Expenditures where evidence suggests (at the 10% significance level) 
that the magnitude of the political cycle is smaller when the incumbent runs for 
another term. 
Given that local politics in Greece are tightly linked to national politics, we 
investigate how mayors’ political alignment with the ruling party11 affects the size of 
political cycles. As before we construct an interaction term, 
Elections*PolAlignment.12The results in Table 2, Columns (5)-(8) document that 
being politically aligned with the central government does not affect the magnitude of 
the electoral effects.
 
 
While the results reported in Table 1 suggest that the years an incumbent has been 
in office do not affect municipal finances, a prolonged incumbency may be expected 
to affect the magnitude of the political budget cycle. An incumbent who has served 
                                                          
11
  Greece has been ruled by single party governments for the entire time period considered. 
12
 PolAlignment takes the value of one when both mayors and central government share party 
affiliation and zero otherwise. 
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for a prolonged period may have greater ability to manipulate local finances, as he 
becomes more familiar with the relevant budgetary process or weaker incentives for 
pre-electoral manipulation. To test how prolonged incumbencies affect the magnitude 
of the electoral effects we include the Years as Mayor*Elections interaction term in 
our model. The results in Table 2, Columns (9)-(12) show that the number of years an 
incumbent has served in office does not affect the magnitude of the PBCs for any of 
the dependent variables used.  
 
<Table 2 about here> 
Our findings suggest a profoundly opportunistic element in the management of 
Greece’s municipal finances. The question that arises naturally is whether this 
opportunism pays. Do increased expenditures during election years affect an 
incumbent’s probability of reelection, and if so, how?  
 
6. Fiscal Manipulation and Reelection Prospects 
 
6.1 Data and Estimation Method 
 
Having identified a robust opportunistic element in the finances of Greek 
municipalities, we examine the potency of such policies in terms of their effect on 
electoral outcomes. A positive response of the public to pre-election spending hikes 
reinforces the incumbents' incentives for manipulating the public finances. To 
investigate whether and how the management of public finances at the local 
government level affects incumbents’ reelection prospects in Greece, we consider 
data on election outcomes from the aforementioned 109 municipalities. The dataset 
ranges from 1985 to 2004, includes 5 electoral years (i.e., 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 
and 2002) and covers four full governing periods. Thus, the dataset permits us to 
investigate how local finances affect reelection possibilities in four out of five 
elections included in our sample. We employ a fixed effects logit approach for the 
panel of Greek Municipalities used before, specified in Equation (2) as: 
,                                               (2) 
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where F is the standard logistic distribution function, zit the dichotomous dependent 
variable (ReElection) taking the value of one if the mayor is re-elected and zero 
otherwise and ηi is the fixed municipality specific effects. The set of explanatory 
variables includes the fiscal variables under the control of the mayor and political-
institutional variables.   
We focus on the effects of two fiscal variables, namely Total Expenditures and 
Investment Expenditures over the full term as well as the effect of opportunistic 
increases that occur during election years. To investigate the latter, we follow the 
approach of Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) and distinguish between average 
expenditures during the first three years of an incumbent’s term and the percentage 
deviation of election year expenditures from this average. With respect to other 
political-institutional variables, we employ in our analysis those used when studying 
the presence of PBC, and we focus on  the Years as Mayor variable that captures the 
amount of time an individual has served as mayor. We expect that an incumbents’ 
popularity weakens over time and repeated terms.  
A panel data logit model constitutes a typical approach in investigating the 
determinants of reelection. A dilemma emerges, however, regarding the choice 
between an unconditional (standard logit MLE estimator) versus a conditional logit 
fixed effect estimator (Chamberlain’s MLE estimator). To decide, we follow the 
suggestion of Baltagi (2008) and perform a Hausman test. Under the null hypothesis 
of homogeneity (no individual effects) both estimators are consistent but the 
conditional logit estimator is inefficient, as it may not use all available data. Under 
the alternative hypothesis, the unconditional estimator is inefficient while the 
conditional is both consistent and efficient (Greene, 2002). The Hausman test in our 
case rejects the homogeneity restriction (that is, the homogeneity hypothesis) and 
suggests the inclusion of fixed effects. Using this procedure reduces the sample size 
since only municipalities where mayors have won and lost elections can be used in 
the estimation.13    
 
6.2 Results and Discussion 
We present the estimation results in Table 3. The baseline specification in Column 
1 shows that greater fiscal expansions during an incumbent’s term, as manifested by 
                                                          
13
 This reduces our sample to 80 municipalities. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
 
 
16 
increases in Total Expenditures, affect positively the probability of reelection. 
Regarding the other variables considered, the evidence suggests that increases in 
government levied taxes negatively affect incumbents’ reelection prospects, while 
higher levels of revenues from governmental direct transfers (GovSubsidies) affect 
them positively. The variables capturing the population structure do not affect the 
reelection prospects of incumbents. The amount of time that an incumbent has spent 
in office, however, strongly affects his reelection prospects. The corresponding 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that 
incumbents are subject to diminishing popularity over repeated terms and prolonged 
incumbency.
14
   
Column (2) reports the results from distinguishing between average expenditures 
in the first three years and the percentage deviation of election year expenditures 
from this average. The two coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level. This finding is comparable to evidence from  other studies (Sakurai and 
Menezes-Filho, 2008; Veiga and Veiga, 2007b). The remaining control variables 
display results that are qualitatively similar to those in Column 1. 
The subcomponent of Investment Expenditures does not appear to have any 
significant effect. The relevant coefficient in Column (3) although positive is not 
statistically significant indicating that only increases in aggregate expenditures (Total 
Expenditures) appear to have a positive impact on incumbents’ reelection. The results 
in Column (4) suggest that this is also the case for average pre-electoral Investment 
Expenditures and election year deviations. This finding is interesting given that other 
related studies find that it is the visible expenditures that affect re-election the most 
(Aidt et al., 2011). We attribute this difference to Greece’s institutional features 
where for a long period of time some investments that are associated with local 
government activities were undertaken by local development corporations that draw 
on a different budget and operated in a non-transparent environment.
15
The other 
coefficients are the same as before. 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
                                                          
14 
For more on this erosion of public support while in office, most commonly termed the cost of ruling, 
see Paldam (1986), Paldam and Skott (1995) and Nannestad and Paldam (2000). 
15
 After the 2010 reform municipalities are allowed to operate only up to one municipal corporation. 
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Our results, consistent with several other studies that provide evidence that pre-
electoral expenditures are electorally rewarded (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004; 
Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2008; Veiga and Veiga, 2007b), document that in the 
case of Greece’s municipalities higher pre-electoral expenditures and election year 
opportunistic deviations are beneficial for incumbent’s reelection. This finding can 
partly explain the emergence of budget cycles and thus the prolonged 
mismanagement in Greece’s local finances.  
 
6.3  Further Evidence and Robustness Checks  
We first examine whether Greece’s effort to join the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) has restricted opportunistic politics at the local level,16 as this process 
may imply additional commitments and constitutional restrictions.17 We restrict our 
sample to the years after 1993 that cover Greece’s run up to joining the EMU and the 
first four years after its admission. The results are similar to those of the baseline 
model and we report them in Appendix A, Table A2, Columns (1)-(4).  
Since the extensive municipal mergers in Greece were introduced to tackle 
concerns over inefficiencies stemming from the small size of municipalities, we 
additionally test whether the presence of electoral effects is driven by the inclusion of 
small municipalities in our sample. We remove municipalities with a population 
smaller than 10,000 inhabitants,18 with results reported in columns (4)-(8) of Table 
A2 (please see Appendix A), being similar to those presented in Table 1.  
 
<Table A2 about here> 
 
Turning now to the full dimension of our panel, we perform a series of additional 
robustness tests. First, as some of the policies may require substantial time to yield 
electoral results, we add a dummy variable to capture the effect of the year before 
                                                          
16
  For the effect of the Maastricht Treaty on economic voting see Veiga (2013). 
17
 With regard to specific restrictions, fiscal rules, imposed by national governments to local 
administrative entities Grembi et al. (2012) study how policy outcomes are affected by them focusing 
on municipal governments in Italy. Their evidence suggest that fiscal rules can reduce debt 
accumulation as their relaxation has a negative effect on the budget through a fall in tax revenues. 
18
 We exclude population category 4 municipalities as the average population after the last reform is 
approximately 30.000 citizens falling into population category 3.  
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elections. Results show that this dummy has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on Total Expenditures, Investment Expenditures, and Borrowing, while the 
effect of Elections remains qualitatively the same as in Table 1. Our results are robust 
to the inclusion of regional GDP per capita19 and regional level of unemployment in 
our model, suggesting that expenditures are procyclical as regional GDP per capita 
positively affects Total Expenditures. When we replace the Years as Mayor variable 
with the number of consecutive terms that a mayor has served, results are 
qualitatively the same as in our baseline model. This is also the case when we 
substitute our Ideology variable with two separate dummies that capture when the 
mayor is of Left wing and Right wing political orientation. Finally, we replace our 
PopCat variable with municipal population. Results remain qualitatively the same as 
in our baseline specification.
 20 
To test the robustness of our results on the effect of opportunistic policies on 
election outcomes, we restrict our sample by excluding small municipalities 
(PopCat=4) and the 1990 municipal elections. The results presented in Table A3 
(Appendix A), remain qualitatively the same as in Table 3, indicating that 
opportunistic policies were electorally beneficial for Greek mayors in the post-
Maastricht era.  
 
<Table A3 about here> 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We provide evidence of opportunistically motivated policies in Greek 
municipalities. We first consider the presence of PBCs in Greece’s municipalities, 
constructing a dataset from raw data that covers 20 years and half of the country’s 
population. The evidence produced shows an opportunistic PBC pattern in the budget 
balance, in total and investment expenditures, and in borrowing revenues. PBCs 
emerge in Greece’s municipalities regardless of whether the mayors run for reelection 
or not, or whether the incumbents are politically aligned with the central government 
or not. Moreover, prolonged incumbencies do not appear to affect municipal finances 
                                                          
19
 The regional GDP per capita is expressed in logarithms of Euros per capita (2005 prices). 
20
 Detailed results are available upon request. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
 
 
19 
and the magnitude of PBCs. The evidence also shows that Greece’s effort to join the 
EMU had no effect on local opportunistic politics. The results are robust to the 
exclusion of small sized municipalities from our sample. This finding is interesting 
given that a key concern permeating all recent attempts to reform local governments 
in Greece was the merging of smaller into larger units.  
We also consider if and how the management of local finances affects mayors’ 
reelection prospects. Our results show that increased expenditures over the full term 
as well as opportunistic deviations during election years are electorally rewarded as 
they have a positive impact on incumbents’ probabilities for reelection.  
Our findings provide insights on the management of local public finances in the 
run-up to the Greek crisis, showing that prolonged mismanagement motivated by 
incumbents’ electoral concerns has been prevalent. This behavior is characteristic of 
practices that contributed to Greece’s current economic predicament. Moreover, this 
opportunistic behavior at the sub-government level has been impervious to the 
various municipal reform attempts and the post-Maastricht implicit constraints, while 
being intertwined with central government politics.  
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TABLES 
Table 1 
Political budget cycles (PBCs) in Greek municipalities: Baseline results. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis with finite-sample correction for the two step covariance 
matrix as developed by Windmeijer (2005). Instruments collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2009b). 
***,**,* denote significance at the 1,5, and 10-percent level. Hansen test for over-identifying 
restriction, where the null H0 corresponds to valid over-identifying restriction. Arellano-Bond test for 
first and second order serial correlation in the first difference residuals, H0: No serial correlation. 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES Budget 
Balance 
 
Total 
Expenditures 
 
Borrowing 
 
Investment 
Expenditures 
Elections -0.0120** 0.0309* 0.792** 0.0815* 
 (0.00528) (0.0174) (0.397) (0.0477) 
GovSubsidies  0.359 -0.0286 0.863*** 
  (0.279) (0.584) (0.312) 
GovLeviedTaxes  -0.0202 0.231 0.160* 
  0.359 -0.0286 0.863*** 
Ideology 0.00349 0.0120 0.0822 0.00949 
 (0.00305) (0.0172) (0.256) (0.0382) 
Population Category 0.00948*** -0.0461 -1.279*** 0.222** 
 (0.00338) (0.0722) (0.429) (0.110) 
Years as Mayor -0.000284 -0.000432 -0.0438 0.00368 
 (0.000609) (0.00186) (0.0558) (0.00584) 
% Pop<15 -0.0149 1.928* 10.97 9.983** 
 (0.120) (1.069) (17.93) (3.953) 
% Pop>65 0.0889 -1.297 -0.468 -1.073 
 (0.109) (1.167) (19.30) (2.935) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable 
0.781*** 0.968** 0.207*** 0.389** 
 (0.0605) (0.388) (0.0501) (0.189) 
Constant -0.0212 0.768** -6.224 -1.038 
 (0.0288) (0.375) (5.305) (1.232) 
     
AR(1) 0.017 0.002 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.116 0.222 0.130 0.899 
Hansen Test 0.389 0.871 0.374 0.317 
No of Instruments 10 13 13 13 
Observations 1511 1495 553 1493 
No of Municipalities 109 109 88 109 
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Table 2 
PBC's in Greek municipalities and the effects of mayors' running for reelection/mayors’ political alignment/prolonged incumbencies. 
VARIABLES (1) 
Budget 
Balance 
(2) 
Total 
Expenditures 
(3) 
Borrowing 
(4) 
Investment 
Expenditures 
(5) 
Budget 
Balance 
(6) 
Total 
Expenditures 
(7) 
Borrowing 
 
(8) 
Investment 
Expenditures 
(9) 
Budget 
Balance 
(10) 
Total 
Expenditures 
(11) 
Borrowing 
 
(12) 
Investment 
Expenditures 
Elections -0.0213*** 0.0774*** 1.016* 0.129* -0.0122** 0.0418* 1.225** 0.153* -0.0236*** 0.0640* 1.443* 0.177* 
 (0.00704) (0.0265) (0.522) (0.0703) (0.00496) (0.0233) (0.593) (0.0893) (0.00896) (0.0366) (0.839) (0.105) 
Elections*Recandidate 0.0136 -0.0652* -0.344 -0.0715         
 (0.00975) (0.0355) (0.579) (0.0976)         
Recandidate -0.00759 0.0225 -0.409 0.0636         
 (0.00565) (0.0182) (0.317) (0.0606)         
Elections*PolAlignment     -0.00993 -0.0175 -0.961 -0.0365     
     (0.00815) (0.0316) (0.868) (0.104)     
PolAlignment     -0.00154 0.0364 0.783 0.00407     
     (0.00364) (0.0246) (0.482) (0.0532)     
Elections*Years as 
Mayor 
        0.000829 -0.00137 -0.0918 -0.00633 
         (0.00133) (0.00435) (0.121) (0.0113) 
GovSubsidies  0.387 -0.278 0.915***  0.639*** -0.0421 0.703***  0.797*** -0.0317 0.744*** 
  (0.281) (0.257) (0.320)  (0.243) (0.574) (0.185)  (0.220) (0.565) (0.214) 
GovLeviedTaxes  -0.0195 0.168 0.161  0.0605 0.231 0.0108  0.113*** 0.244 0.0243 
  (0.0524) (0.197) (0.0980)  0.639*** -0.0421 0.703***  (0.0322) (0.358) (0.0569) 
             
Ideology 0.00340 0.0128 0.0685 0.00934 0.00119 0.00123 0.0327* 0.163 0.00262 0.0267 0.0861 0.0333 
 (0.00307) (0.0171) (0.194) (0.0387) (0.00375) (0.00244) (0.0189) (0.277) (0.00257) (0.0214) (0.259) (0.0336) 
Population Category 0.00984*** -0.0480 -1.494*** 0.218* 0.00884 0.00832*** 0.0382 -1.277*** 0.00827*** 0.0777** -1.262*** 0.135* 
 (0.00344) (0.0720) (0.252) (0.112) (0.00548) (0.00310) (0.0668) (0.424) (0.00308) (0.0365) (0.432) (0.0710) 
Years as Mayor -0.000002 -0.000883 -0.0858** 0.00366 0.00110 0.00066 0.000269 -0.0436 -0.000007 -0.00438 -0.0215 0.00336 
 (0.000632) (0.00199) (0.0426) (0.00591) (0.000709) (0.000533) (0.00203) (0.0559) (0.000630) (0.00527) (0.0634) (0.00575) 
% Pop<15 0.00217 1.992* 7.610 10.27*** 0.187 -0.124 1.728 13.25 -0.119 0.762 10.89 8.199*** 
 (0.121) (1.066) (12.15) (3.956) (0.296) (0.112) (1.100) (17.86) (0.111) (1.903) (18.15) (3.168) 
% Pop>65 0.0658 -1.329 -2.770 -1.022 0.288 0.0978 -1.558 -0.202 0.0988 -1.050 0.0469 -2.828 
 (0.106) (1.176) (14.50) (3.079) (0.254) (0.0989) (0.990) (18.90) (0.101) (1.449) (19.37) (2.913) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable 
0.779*** 0.957** 0.230*** 0.375** 0.822*** 0.525 0.207*** 0.499*** 0.821*** 0.223** 0.209*** 0.483*** 
 (0.0611) (0.390) (0.0277) (0.186) (0.0554) (0.334) (0.0502) (0.0518) (0.0551) (0.0885) (0.0497) (0.0520) 
Constant -0.0173 0.815** -4.908 -1.032 -0.00414 1.151*** -6.952 -1.360* -0.00451 1.434*** -6.374 -0.931 
 (0.0291) (0.379) (3.666) (1.253) (0.0268) (0.289) (5.254) (0.790) (0.0267) (0.423) (5.325) (0.834) 
AR(1) 0.017 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.007 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.116 0.234 0.133 0.905 0.116 0.223 0.148 0.934 0.118 0.256 0.135 0.955 
Hansen Test 0.395 0.853 0.316 0.350 0.422 0.807 0.379 0.371 0.423 0.868 0.371 0.373 
No of Instruments 12 15 15 15 12 15 15 15 11 14 14 14 
Observations 1478 1462 539 1460 1478 1462 539 1460 1478 1462 539 1460 
No of Municipalities 109 109 88 109 109 109 88 109 109 109 88 109 
Notes:  See Table 1
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Table 3 
The effect of budgetary policies on re-election prospects. 
 Full Sample 
Dependent Variable: ReElection (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Expenditures (full mandate) 3.796**    
 (1.878)    
Average pre-election Total Expenditures  4.067**   
  (1.984)   
Deviation from Average Total Expenditures (during election year)  0.0270**   
  (0.0127)   
Investment Expenditures (full mandate)   0.271  
   (0.456)  
Average pre-election Investment Expenditures    0.244 
    (0.454) 
Deviation from Average Investment Expenditures (during election year)    0.00505 
    (0.00338) 
GovSubsidies 1.496* 1.560* 1.595* 1.553* 
 (0.899) (0.910) (0.861) (0.855) 
GovLeviedTaxes -0.555* -0.602** -0.599** -0.635** 
 (0.303) (0.292) (0.296) (0.290) 
Population Category -2.146* -2.535** -1.907* -2.189* 
 (1.136) (1.201) (1.140) (1.182) 
% Pop<15 -39.82 -38.53 30.70 -2.841 
 (106.3) (107.3) (99.41) (107.5) 
% Pop>65 11.17 -6.036 6.850 -3.117 
 (75.73) (81.99) (70.89) (74.26) 
Ideology 0.356 0.349 0.426 0.463 
 (0.395) (0.407) (0.378) (0.381) 
Years as mayor -0.518*** -0.528*** -0.529*** -0.511*** 
 (0.0938) (0.0952) (0.0907) (0.0894) 
Pseudo R
2 
0.5581 0.5729 0.5363 0.5477 
Hausman Test χ2= 26.97 χ2=27.08 χ2=30.02 χ2=29.60 
 Prob=0.00 Prob=0.00 Prob=0.00 Prob=0.00 
Observations 232 232 232 233 
No of Municipalities 80 80 80 80 
Notes: Coefficients from logit fixed-effects regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* denote  significance at 
the 1,5, and 10-percent level. 
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APPENDIX A  
Table A1 
Descriptive Statistics. 
Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority. Dataset constructed by the authors. 
Notes:  Fiscal Variables are expressed in Euros per capita (2005 prices)  
 
Variable  Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Per Capita Budget Balance
 2079 0,019 0,304 -4,854 2,442 
Log of Per Capita Total Expenditures 2083 -1,176 0,584 -4,010 2,952 
Log of Per Capita Borrowing 1156 -4,665 1,848 -13,940 1,733 
Log of Per Capita Investment Expenditures 2086 -2,902 0,981 -10,031 1,852 
Log of Per Capita GovSubsidies 2079 -2,557 0,624 -11,527 0,436 
Log of Per Capita GovLeviedTaxes 2072 -4,772 1,332 -10,846 1,348 
Log of Per Capita Region Level GDP 1090 9,705 0,132 9,382 10,005 
Log of Region Level Unemployment 1635 2,330 0,232 0,888 2,847 
Percentage of the population under 15 years old  
(% Pop<15) 
1526 16,335 1,931 13,476 22,040 
Percentage of the population over 65 years old  
(% Pop>65) 
1526 14,121 1,923 10,603 22,452 
Population Category 2180 2.934 0,770 1 4 
Years as Mayor 2180   5,649 3,9521 1 22 
Elections 2180 0,25 0,433 0 1 
Ideology 2180 -0.379 0,820 -1 1 
PolAlignment 2074 0,495 0,50 0 1 
Recandidate 2180 0,205 0,404 0 1 
ReElection 436 0,527 0,499 0 1 
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 Table A2 
 PBC's in Greek municipalities: Restricted sample. 
 
Restricted Time Span: 1994-2004 Municipalities with population < 10,000 excluded from the sample. 
 (1) 
Budget Balance 
(2) 
Total Expenditures 
 
(3) 
Borrowing 
 
(4) 
Investment Expenditures 
 
(5) 
Budget Balance 
 
(6) 
Total Expenditures 
 
(7) 
Borrowing 
 
(8) 
Investment Expenditures 
 
Elections -0.0129** 0.0376** 0.787** 0.0786* -0.0101** 0.624*** 0.878* 0.116** 
 (0.00540) (0.0178) (0.399) (0.0473) (0.00492) (0.238) (0.491) (0.0513) 
         
AR(1) 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.001 
AR(2) 0.054 0.131 0.081 0.815 0.161 0.076 0.246 0.697 
Hansen Test 0.398 0.770 0.574 0.563 0.579 0.789 0.050 0.965 
No of Instruments 10 13 13 13 10 13 13 13 
         
Elections -0.0226*** 0.0874*** 1.653*** 0.151** -0.0128*** 0.0726** 0.355 0.170** 
 (0.00711) (0.0275) (0.555) (0.0698) (0.00453) (0.0284) (0.480) (0.0745) 
Elections*Recandidate 0.0142 -0.0697** -1.049 -0.110 0.00475 -0.0558 0.542 -0.0802 
 (0.0101) (0.0355) (0.665) (0.0934) (0.00828) (0.0396) (0.531) (0.102) 
Recandidate -0.00835 0.0290 0.0407 0.0922 -0.00650 0.0178 -0.703** 0.0563 
 (0.00649) (0.0212) (0.380) (0.0635) (0.00564) (0.0197) (0.328) (0.0653) 
AR(1) 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.047 0.005 0.000 0.001 
AR(2) 0.054 0.141 0.103 0.759 0.161 0.076 0.297 0.690 
Hansen Test 0.401 0.776 0.572 0.552 0.585 0.757 0.431 0.981 
No of Instruments 12 15 15 15 12 15 15 15 
         
Elections -0.0128** 0.0448* 1.172** 0.113* -0.0131*** 0.0554** 1.447* 0.156* 
 (0.00524) (0.0234) (0.592) (0.0687) (0.00491) (0.0256) (0.807) (0.0832) 
Elections*PolAlignment -0.00982 -0.00681 -0.851 0.0199 -0.000649 -0.0164 -1.086 0.0127 
 (0.00815) (0.0339) (0.863) (0.0855) (0.00751) (0.0346) (1.086) (0.100) 
PolAlignment -0.00153 0.0255 0.703 0.0304 -0.000683 0.00299 0.615 -0.00615 
 (0.00539) (0.0210) (0.561) (0.0605) (0.00409) (0.0181) (0.571) (0.0623) 
AR(1) 0.017 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.115 0.216 0.093 0.825 0.110 0.093 0.277 0.695 
Hansen Test 0.430 0.621 0.685 0.579 0.388 0.764 0.099 0.952 
No of Instruments 12 15 15 15 12 15 15 15 
         
Observations 1199 1185 411 1180 1178 1176 491 1177 
No of Municipalities 109 109 88 109 90 90 77 90 
Notes: See Table 1. Control Variables used are the same as in Table 1 and are not reported to economize on space. Detailed results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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Table A3 
The effect of budgetary policies on re-election prospects: Restricted sample. 
 Restricted Sample 
DependentVariable: ReElection (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Expenditures (full mandate) 6.107***    
 (2.298)    
Average preelection Total Expenditures  6.348***   
  (2.367)   
Deviation from Average Total Expenditures 
(during election year) 
 
0.0267*   
  (0.0137)   
Investment Expenditures (full mandate)   0.620  
   (0.568)  
Average preelection Investment Expenditures    0.605 
    (0.579) 
Deviation from Average Investment Expenditures 
(during election year) 
 
 
 
0.00440 
    (0.00350) 
GovSubsidies 0.995 1.229 0.974 1.062 
 (1.239) (1.248) (1.171) (1.141) 
GovLeviedTaxes -0.626* -0.679* -0.582* -0.622* 
 (0.359) (0.361) (0.323) (0.324) 
Population Category -1.496 -1.454 -1.511 -1.734 
 (1.817) (1.859) (1.697) (1.729) 
% Pop<15 137.2 140.5 103.7 69.37 
 (151.1) (154.1) (142.0) (151.3) 
% Pop>65 29.92 17.76 33.42 25.60 
 (93.45) (97.85) (83.75) (86.41) 
Ideology 0.0794 0.0939 0.334 0.404 
 (0.458) (0.461) (0.432) (0.437) 
Years as mayor -0.478*** -0.477*** -0.472*** -0.457*** 
 (0.0966) (0.0953) (0.0899) (0.0895) 
Pseudo R
2 
0.5551 0.5628 0.5079 0.5144 
Hausman Test χ2= 22.43 χ2=22.81 χ2=23.83 χ2=22.41 
 Prob=0.01 Prob=0.01 Prob=0.00 Prob=0.01 
Observations 194 194 195 195 
No of Municipalities 67 67 67 67 
Notes: See Table 3 
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Political Budget Cycles and Reelection Prospects 
 in Greece’s Municipalities 
 
HIGHLIGHTS 
 
 We consider the presence of political budget cycles in Greece’s municipalities. 
 We construct a new dataset and find strong evidence of pre-electoral manipulation. 
 The results are robust in the face of a series of controls. 
 Opportunistic behavior appears impervious to various municipal reform attempts. 
 Opportunistic policies have also been electorally rewarding. 
